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More than a dichotomy 
 
If you are like me, an occasional mountaineer, you will have cheerfully noted 
the burgeoning number of South Island conservation parks which include Te 
Papanui, Hawea, Ahuriri, Ruataniwha, Oteake, Hakatere, Te Kahui Kaupeka. 
Mountain and foothill recreationists have a rapidly expanding set of new parks 
to climb in, scramble over, photograph. The growth in number of parks is a 
manifestation of a New Zealand approach to conservation – assessment of 
areas as having conservation merit, are often followed by public purchase and 
management for conservation and recreation.  
 
The recently released Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
report Changes in the High Country: Environmental stewardship and Tenure 
Review comments on the simple approach New Zealand often applies in 
pursuit of environmental conservation and natural resource management 
goals. Its worth asking if there are alternatives to a simple dichotomisation into 
publicly owned conservation land and privately owned production land.  
 
What goals are we seeking to achieve by way of public ownership of land in 
the High Country? Land in the High Country can provide multiple ecosystem 
services including agricultural and forestry production, recreation 
opportunities, habitat for species and ecosystems, superb vistas and 
landscapes, nutrient cycling, catchments for streams, unpolluted catchments 
for streams, rivers and lakes. Some of these ecosystem services can be 
degraded by ill-considered actions and there are examples of modified 
landscapes, restricted recreation opportunities, rampant wilding conifers and 
woody weeds, and habitat losses in the High Country.  
 
Those examples might suggest that private ownership of land in the high 
country would not deliver acceptable outcomes. But there are alternatives to 
public ownership to achieve environmental goals and it’s worth asking if New 
Zealand is using a wide enough array of policy mechanisms in the High 
Country? It’s also worth asking if New Zealand is overreaching and trying to 
achieve too much in the High Country?  
 
A recent paper by David Pannell (2008) is worth reading when considering 
those questions. Pannell notes there are five broad types of policy 
mechanisms available to achieve changes in management on private land: 
positive incentives (financial or regulatory instruments to encourage change), 
negative incentives (financial or regulatory instruments to discourage change), 
extension, technology development through R&D or new infrastructure to 
encourage change, informed inaction. Environmental managers can propose 
a range of projects to achieve changes in land management or land use on 
private land, and those projects will vary in the levels of public and private net 
benefits flowing from them. Net benefits may even be negative for some 
projects. Figure 1 illustrates the range of outcomes that could arise for any 
project. At the centre of the diagram public and private net benefits are zero. 
Points to the right of the centre provide positive net benefits, points to the left 
of centre provide negative net benefits. 
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Figure 1. Sample space for potential land management change projects. 
Adapted from Pannell (2008). 
 
Policies in the High Country might be assessed to determine if they will 
provide overall positive net benefits. Projects that fall in areas A, B and C 
meet that test, but projects in areas D, E, F fail the test. In area A, creation of 
a riparian buffer strip may be costly to a landholder but provide greater public 
benefits from improved water quality. In area B, avoidance of summer burning 
will provide net benefits to the landowner and the public. In area C, cultivation 
of an area for pasture may provide net benefits to the landowner that are 
larger than the net costs to the public from loss of a tussock landscape. 
 
Can we identify where use of the five types of policy mechanisms are 
warranted? Pannell proposes we assume initially that landholders will adopt 
land management practices that provide positive private net benefits (areas B, 
C and D), if they learn about the practices at assumed zero cost. Positive 
incentives are warranted only in area A where they provide public net 
benefits, overall positive net benefits and would not already be adopted by 
landholders. What about use of extension as a main tool to improve land use 
decision-making? Pannell argues extension should only be used if the change 
being advocated would be adoptable – provide positive net private benefits, 
and generate net public benefits. Only area B meets those rules. If private net 
benefits are larger than public net costs (area C) either no action is justified, 
or a negative incentive such as a pollution charge could be used. If public net 
costs outweigh private net benefits (area D) negative incentives should be 
used. If both public and private net benefits are negative, adverse 
environmental practices are unlikely to be adopted if the negative net benefits 
are perceived and no action or negative incentives are appropriate. If private 
net costs are greater than public net benefits (area F), R&D to create 
improved land management practices that can be adopted by landholders is 
appropriate. 
-ve              Private net benefit                  +ve 
+ve 
 
 
 
Public 
net 
benefit 
 
 
 
-ve 
This initial assessment of where use of the various policy types is warranted is 
built on several assumptions both explicit and implicit. Selection of policies to 
tackle land management issues needs to recognise several complexities 
including: landowners are unlikely to adopt a new land management practice 
unless it has an attractive benefit : cost ratio;  there are learning costs before 
new practices are understood; there are lags before practices are adopted; 
there are monitoring and enforcement costs for negative incentive  policies; 
and there are transactions costs involved in implementing extension 
programmes. The impact of recognising those complexities is a significant 
shrinkage in the space where positive incentives and extension are warranted 
and a much larger space where no action (or possibly negative incentives or 
extension) is warranted. 
 
State ownership and management of land is one way environmental goals 
can be pursued in the high country. Recent purchases indicate the 
transactions and fiscal costs of a state land ownership policy are large. 
Careful assessment is needed to determine if that policy has a better benefit 
cost ratio than would other policies to achieve environmental goals. Careful 
assessment might also reveal areas where positive incentives, negative 
incentives and extension are appropriate alternative ways to achieve 
environmental goals without resorting to state purchase and management. 
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